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Disrupting the prefrontal cortex diminishes the human ability to
build a good reputation
Abstract
Reputation formation pervades human social life. In fact, many people go to great lengths to acquire a
good reputation, even though building a good reputation is costly in many cases. Little is known about
the neural underpinnings of this important social mechanism, however. In the present study, we show
that disruption of the right, but not the left, lateral prefrontal cortex (PFC) with low-frequency repetitive
transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) diminishes subjects' ability to build a favorable reputation.
This effect occurs even though subjects' ability to behave altruistically in the absence of reputation
incentives remains intact, and even though they are still able to recognize both the fairness standards
necessary for acquiring and the future benefits of a good reputation. Thus, subjects with a disrupted right
lateral PFC no longer seem to be able to resist the temptation to defect, even though they know that this
has detrimental effects on their future reputation. This suggests an important dissociation between the
knowledge about one's own best interests and the ability to act accordingly in social contexts. These
results link findings on the neural underpinnings of self-control and temptation with the study of human
social behavior, and they may help explain why reputation formation remains less prominent in most
other species with less developed prefrontal cortices. 
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Reputation formation pervades human social life. In fact, many people go to great 
lengths to acquire a good reputation, although building a good reputation is costly in 
many cases. We know little, however, about the neural underpinnings of this important 
social mechanism. In the present study we show that disruption of the right, but not the 
left, lateral prefrontal cortex (PFC) with low-frequency repetitive transcranial magnetic 
stimulation (rTMS) diminishes subjects’ ability to build a favorable reputation. This 
effect occurs even though subjects’ ability to behave altruistically in the absence of 
reputation incentives remains intact, and even though they are still able to recognize 
both the fairness standards necessary for acquiring and the future benefits of a good 
reputation. Thus, subjects with a disrupted right lateral PFC no longer seem to be able 
to resist the temptation to defect, even though they know that this has detrimental 
effects on their future reputation. This suggests an important dissociation between the 
knowledge about one’s own best interests and the ability to act accordingly in social 
contexts. These results link findings on the neural underpinnings of self-control and 
temptation with the study of human social behavior, and they may help explain why 
reputation formation remains less prominent in most other species with less developed 
prefrontal cortices. 
Introduction. Humans are unique to the extent to which social norms regulate their lives and 
reputation formation is a powerful mechanism in generating norm compliance. “Reputation is 
what you are in the light; character is what you are in the dark”, says a Chinese proverb. In 
other words, although much norm compliance is voluntary, there is ample evidence that 
people are more likely to comply with norms when they feel observed by others. In such a 
situation (“in the light”), individuals signal their quality as cooperators to future interaction 
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partners, thereby forming a good reputation.  
Reputation formation is characterized by two features: First, the signals for building a good 
reputation (in human societies) are costly in many cases; otherwise they would be “cheap 
talk”, and therefore of no informational value for the potential interaction partner. Second, 
this process of costly reputation formation is characterized by a trade-off between the current 
benefits of defection and one’s future benefits of a good reputation.  
Evidence for the crucial role of a good reputation in social decision-making comes from 
empirical studies showing that individuals increase their levels of cooperation and are more 
likely to comply with norms when they know that others observe their behavior, and that 
individuals cooperate with those whom they observe cooperating with others1-16. Hence, the 
concern for reputation profoundly affects our daily social interactions and motivates many 
important decisions in our lives.  
Although reputation formation mechanisms are ubiquitous in social exchange, their 
neurobiological substrate remains largely unknown. Moreover, a universal question arises, 
one with relevance not only to cognitive neuroscience but also to fields of research in 
evolutionary biology, developmental psychology, and behavioral economics: Which skills 
are required in order to acquire a good reputation? Intuitively, we assume that there must be a 
self-control capacity because forming a reputation typically requires an individual to 
overcome the temptation to defect in order to gain future reputation benefits. From a 
neurobiological perspective, we thus assume the involvement of the PFC, as this region has 
been shown to be involved in self-control processes 17-19. 
Four previous neuroimaging studies have examined reputation20-23. Two of these studies 
did not address the neural underpinnings of the process of individual reputation formation, 
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i.e. they did not focus on the individual who forms a reputation. Instead, they examined 
individuals who made decisions based on reputation information about another 
individual20,21. In one of the studies, for example, subjects played iterative trust games with 
three partners whose (fictional) profiles make them seem morally good, bad, or neutral21. The 
study shows that information about the interaction partner's moral reputation affects the 
investors’ reward prediction error signal in the caudate nucleus during reciprocal exchange. 
Another study showed that reward-related brain areas were activated when a subject learned 
that others perceive his or her reputation as good22. Finally, one study used hyperscanning 
fMRI while two interacting partners played an iterated trust game and showed that the peak 
activation of the caudate nucleus underwent a temporal shift as the reputation of the 
interaction partner developed23.  
However, none of these studies provides causal evidence about the brain processes 
involved in costly reputation formation. Functional imaging methods, although 
indispensable, do not permit causal inferences about the effect of brain processes on human 
behavior because the observed neural activations could be spuriously correlated with task 
performance and need not necessarily play a causal role in task execution24,25. In contrast, 
brain stimulation techniques such as transcranial magnetic stimulation interfere non-
invasively with the activity of defined areas in the human cortex, thus enabling researchers to 
observe the behavioral impact of an increase or decrease in the cortical excitability of the 
stimulated brain region. Low-frequency rTMS for the duration of several minutes leads to a 
suppression of activity in the stimulated brain region that outlasts the duration of the rTMS 
train for about half the duration of the stimulation26,27. Here, we investigated the effect of 
disrupting the PFC by means of rTMS on subjects’ reputation formation.  
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We chose a version of the trust game (Fig. 1A) as a vehicle for investigating the effects 
of rTMS on costly reputation formation. Subjects played 15 periods of this trust game with 
randomly re-matched partners each period (see Supplementary Information).  
We implemented two treatment conditions, an “anonymous condition” and a “reputation 
condition”. In the anonymous condition, the trustee's previous decisions are unknown to the 
current investor, while the investor has information about the trustee in the reputation 
condition (Fig. 1B). He can observe the trustee’s decisions in the previous three periods (i.e., 
how many times the trustee chose to back-transfer “nothing”, “a quarter” or “equalize 
payoff”). Hence, a trustee is likely to acquire a bad reputation by choosing to back-transfer 
“nothing”, whereas a trustee improves his reputation by choosing “equalize payoff”. As a 
trustee who transfers nothing is unlikely to receive high transfers from the investors in future 
periods, the trustees have an incentive to make relatively high back-transfers in the reputation 
condition. This reputation incentive therefore generates a motivational conflict for the 
trustees. A trustee could maximize his short-run self-interest by choosing to transfer nothing 
back to the investor in the current period, but this action is likely to have detrimental effects 
for his reputation and decreases future investors’ willingness to transfer money to him. 
Therefore, in order to reap the benefits from a good reputation in future periods, a trustee 
must constrain his immediate self-interest and forgo the current option of transferring back 
nothing.  
In contrast, the strategic incentive for behaving in a cooperative manner is fully absent 
in the anonymous condition because the investors have no information about the trustees’ 
past behavior. In terms of the Chinese proverb cited at the beginning the trustees in the 
anonymous condition act in perfect darkness and only their “character” plays a role. Thus, 
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the anonymous condition measures how much the trustee is willing to return voluntarily to 
the investor (which may be viewed as a form of altruistic behavior). This amount reflects the 
trustee’s preference for back-transferring if there are no strategic reputation incentives. 
Consequently, if the trustee returns amount X to the investor in the anonymous condition, 
then the trustee is apparently not willing to return more than X. However, the trustee very 
well might return more than X in the reputation condition, as strategic incentives for 
reputation formation are then present, i. e. the trustee must override his immediate self-
interest in this case to build a good reputation.  
How will the disruption of the PFC with low-frequency rTMS affect the trustees’ 
behavior? As the lateral PFC has been shown to be reliably involved in overriding prepotent 
responses and self-control processes17-19, and as costly reputation formation requires 
overriding immediate benefits, disrupting this brain region should functionally weaken the 
self-control capacity and should thus lead to a lower back-transfer in the reputation condition 
compared to the other stimulation groups. In contrast, little or no self-control effort is 
involved in the anonymous condition because the trustee has no reputational incentive to 
back-transfer more than his immediate preference dictates. Therefore, we would expect little 
difference between the stimulation groups for the anonymous condition. Moreover, as the 
right lateral PFC in particular has been shown to be involved in control capacities17,19, we 
hypothesized that disruption of the right, but not the left, lateral PFC will lead to difficulties 
in resisting the temptation to go for the immediate benefit and thus reduce the ability to form 
a good reputation.  
It is important to note that the trustee in the reputation condition knows that the investor 
only has information about his three previous choices (i.e., “nothing”, “a quarter” or 
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“equalize payoff”), but not about how high the corresponding previous investors’ 
investments were in the last three periods. For example, if a trustee receives an investment of 
1 point and chooses “equalize payoff” in order to form a good reputation, he actually back-
transfers 2.5 points. This is because he in fact received 4 points (1 point, quadrupled by the 
experimenter) and back-transferring 2.5 of those 4 points together with the initial endowment 
of 10 points leaves both the investor and the trustee with equal amounts totaling 11.5 points. 
If a trustee receives an investment of 10 points and chooses “equalize payoff”, his back-
transfer is 25 points, and both players end up with a total of 25 points. Because future 
investors will only observe the choice “equalize payoff“, and not the amount actually 
transferred by the investor, the trustee’s reputational benefit is the same in both cases. The 
immediate costs, however, are different: 2.5 points in the first case, compared to 25 points in 
the second case. Therefore, the costs of reputation formation (i.e., the number of points the 
trustee has to forego in order to form a good reputation) vary with the size of the investment 
while the effect of a particular choice on a trustee’s reputation is always the same, regardless 
of the received investment. In other words, while the future reputational value of a trustee’s 
choice is independent of the investor’s investments, the immediate cost of reputation 
formation, and thus the temptation to maximize one’s short-run self-interest, varies with the 
size of the investment. Therefore, the self-control effort necessary to constrain short-run self-
interest is likely to be much higher in case of a large investment compared to a small 
investment where reputation formation is almost costless. This variation in the temptation to 
maximize one’s short-run self-interest by paying back nothing enables us to investigate 
whether the effect of disrupting the lateral PFC depends on the degree of self-control 
required for reputation formation.  
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This feature of our design puts important constraints on the interpretation of a possible 
effect of right lateral PFC disruption. If, for example, rTMS of right PFC primarily reduces 
the trustees’ back-transfers in the reputation condition at low investment levels, an 
interpretation of this effect in terms of reduced self-control abilities is less convincing 
because little temptation to defect exists at low investment levels. However, if rTMS 
primarily affects their back-transfers at high investment levels where the temptation to defect 
is high, an interpretation in terms of reduced self-control makes a lot of sense. In order to 
examine whether the lateral PFC activity is crucial in the trustees’ reputation formation, we 
applied low-frequency rTMS over the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) for 15 minutes 
to healthy subjects in the role of the responder (see Methods). 
Results. Our results show that reputation formation pays off for the trustees in the long 
run, since investors give more points to trustees who cooperated in the past than to defectors. 
Trustees have a 71% probability of receiving a 10 points investment if they had always 
equalized payoffs, but this drops to a probability of less than 6% if they always chose to 
back-transfer “nothing”. Consequently, a strategy of cooperating in the first 14 periods and 
defecting in the last one (rational cooperation) is on average 43% more profitable (371 
points) than always defecting (260 points). Hence, the trustees have an incentive to constrain 
their short-run self-interest and to back-transfer a high amount in the reputation condition 
because the investors condition their investments on the trustee’s past actions. Accordingly, 
our results show that trustees cared a lot about their reputation when reputation formation 
was possible. Subjects sent back on average 24.9% of the transferred amount in the 
anonymous condition, while in the reputation condition they transferred back 43.8% on 
average (Fig. 2).  
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Of primary interest are back-transfers with regard to the investors’ highest investment 
because the temptation to follow short-run self-interest and, therefore, the requirement for 
self-control effort is greatest in this case. Focusing on the reputation condition (Fig. 3A), we 
see that the back-transfer for the highest investment was 41.2% following sham rTMS and 
48.0% after real rTMS of the left DLPFC. These results contrast sharply with the back-
transfer of 29.7% after rTMS of the right DLPFC. The differences in back-transfers across 
the stimulation groups are significant in the reputation condition (GLS regression, P<0.001 
for the difference between right DLPFC and left DLPFC, and P = 0.015 for the difference 
between right DLPFC and sham condition, for details see Supplementary Information). In 
contrast, we found no significant differences in back-transfers between the three stimulation 
groups in the anonymous condition (Fig. 3B; GLS regression, P = 0.816 for the difference 
between right DLPFC and left DLPFC, and P = 0.232 for the difference between right 
DLPFC and sham).  
In other words, while disruption of the right DLPFC significantly reduces back-transfers 
in the reputation condition in cases of highest investment, it does not do so in the anonymous 
condition. Thus, there is a significant differential effect of rTMS across stimulations (right 
DLPFC, left DLPFC, sham) in the reputation condition, but not in the anonymous condition 
(see Supplementary Information for additional statistical analyses).  
Interestingly, those subjects in the reputation condition who received rTMS to the right 
DLPFC transferred similar amounts back to the investor as those in the anonymous condition 
(compare Fig. 3A and 3B; P = 0.667, t-test). Hence, disrupting the right DLPFC completely 
removed the behavioral impact of the reputation condition while it had no effect on behavior 
when reputation formation was not possible. Moreover, there are no significant differences 
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across stimulation groups for lower investments, where the temptation to yield to short-run 
gains and thus the recruitment of self-control effort is lower (all P > 0.193).  
rTMS of the right DLPFC limited subjects’ ability to override immediate short-run 
benefits. However, rTMS neither changed subjects’ perception of the prevailing fairness 
norm, nor their ability to assess the consequences of past and current trustee behaviors on 
future investments, which we elicited immediately after the experiment (see Methods). First, 
subjects in all three stimulation groups judged the scenario of transferring back nothing in 
response to an investment of 7 as rather unfair, and there are no differences in fairness 
judgments across groups (P = 0.376, Kruskal-Wallis test). Second, rTMS of the right DLPFC 
did not change subjects’ ability to assess the consequences of past and current trustee 
behaviors, since subjects in the different stimulation groups predict the same investments by 
future investors in response to a given profile of past back-transfers (P = 0.950, Kruskal-
Wallis test). Moreover, if rTMS of the right DLPFC had impaired subjects’ general ability to 
perform complex calculations, then we would have observed differences across stimulation 
groups also for the lower investments, but our results show a behavioral effect only for 
highest investments. Thus, the disruption of the right DLPFC has an effect on the behavioral 
ability to form a good reputation, even though it affected neither subjects’ ability to perform 
complex cognitive operations nor their recognition of the prevailing fairness norm nor their 
ability to assess the future consequences of back-transfer behaviors.  
We also checked whether individual differences in impulsivity and the propensity to 
reciprocate kind or hostile acts can explain our results. We find that neither dispositional 
differences in subjects’ reciprocity norm nor individual differences in impulsivity across 
treatment groups can explain the behavioral differences across conditions: there was no 
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difference across treatments for impulsivity (BIS scale: P = 0.827, BAS scale: P = 0.967, 
Kruskal-Wallis tests) and no difference across treatments for the reciprocity norm (positive 
reciprocity scale: P = 0.741, negative reciprocity scale: P = 0.971, Kruskal-Wallis tests).  
Discussion. The results reported above indicate a highly specific, lateralized effect of a 
disrupted function of the lateral PFC on the ability to form a reputation for being trustworthy. 
First, we do not find any differences between the stimulation groups in the anonymous 
condition where the incentives for reputation formation are absent. In this condition, only 
subjects’ preferences for altruistic behaviors can induce them to repay trust, implying that an 
interference with the function of the right lateral PFC leaves subjects’ altruistic propensities 
to behave in a trustworthy manner unchanged. This contrasts, second, with an rTMS effect in 
those circumstances in which costly reputation formation requires a particularly strong 
recruitment of self-control effort, i.e. when the investors make a high investment. In this 
situation, the incentive to yield to the short-run costs for building a reputation are largest, 
suggesting an interpretation of the rTMS effect in terms of the reduced ability to recruit the 
required self-control resources. Third, the absence of any rTMS effect on subjects’ ability to 
recognize the prevailing fairness norm supports this. Thus, despite the fact that subjects are 
well aware of the existing fairness norm, and although they have pecuniary incentives to 
obey this norm in the reputation condition, they nevertheless do not follow it, suggesting that 
rTMS causes a specific inability to constrain short-run temptations rather than a cognitive 
inability to perceive the normative demands involved in the situation. Fourth, the fact that 
rTMS has no effect on subjects’ ability to assess the future consequences of past back-
transfers further supports our interpretation. Subjects across all three stimulation conditions 
have the same knowledge about the future benefits of high current back-transfers, but only 
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subjects with transiently disrupted right DLPFC function are less able to constrain their short-
run self-interest and thus exploit this knowledge.  
Taken together, these results support the hypothesis that right, but not left, lateral PFC 
activity is crucial in the ability to forego immediate benefits in order to form a good 
reputation. Subjects whose right lateral PFC is disrupted behave as if they were not 
concerned about their reputation when reputation formation required forgoing a large current 
benefit, suggesting that they are less able to pay an immediate cost for future social 
reputation benefits although their ability to assess these benefits cognitively remains intact. 
These findings suggest an important dissociation at the neurobiological level between the 
knowledge about what is in one’s own best interest in social interaction situations and the 
ability to act accordingly. Moreover, by providing causal evidence on the role of the 
prefrontal cortex for costly reputation formation, our findings may also help explain why 
reputation mechanisms are rare in other species, whose prefrontal regions are less developed. 
However, brain areas do not act in isolation of each other in highly complex processes such 
as reputation formation, but rather must work together as a network. Future studies could 
combine low frequency rTMS and fMRI to understand how different brain regions interact 
on the functional-anatomical level in reputation formation. 
 
Materials and Methods.  
Transcranial magnetic stimulation. We applied low-frequency rTMS for 15 minutes to 87 
healthy subjects in the role of the trustee (see Supplemental Information for further details). 
In order to investigate a possible hemispheric laterality in the role of lateral PFC on trustees’ 
decisions, we applied rTMS to the right DLPFC or to the left DLPFC. The existence of a 
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stimulation group receiving rTMS to the right DLPFC and a control group that receives 
rTMS to the left DLPFC is also important because this controls for the potential side effects 
of rTMS28, including discomfort, irritation, and mood changes. In addition, we had a further 
control condition where we applied sham stimulation for 15 minutes to the right or left 
DLPFC. As mentioned above, we implemented an anonymous condition and a reputation 
condition. Hence, the experiment has a 2x3 design with the factors “condition” (anonymous, 
reputation) and “stimulation” (left rTMS, right rTMS, sham) leading to six experimental 
groups (see Table S1). We randomly assigned subjects to one of the six groups.  
Measurement of fairness norms. Because the disruption of the PFC might also affect 
subjects’ perception of what constitutes the social norm in a certain situation, we further 
elicited individuals’ perception of fairness norms immediately after the trust game by 
confronting them with a hypothetical scenario. We asked participants to judge the fairness of 
a hypothetical trustee’s behavior on a seven point scale from “very unfair” to “very fair”. The 
scenario described an investor who invests 7 points while the trustee returns nothing. 
Measurement of the ability to assess the consequences of past and current trustee behaviors. 
The disruption of the PFC might also affect subjects’ ability to assess the consequences of a 
particular reputation, i.e. to assess the impact of one’s actions on future social interaction, an 
abstract and cognitively demanding task. In order to rule out this explanation, we gave 
subjects another scenario to measure an individual’s assessment of the potential 
consequences of a certain reputation. We asked subjects how many points (1, 4, 7 or 10 
points) they would expect an investor to transfer to a trustee who had chosen to “equalize 
payoff” twice and to back-transfer “nothing” once.  
Measurement of dispositional differences in impulsivity and reciprocity. Subjects completed 
personality questionnaires that assessed their impulsivity29 – using the Behavioral Inhibition 
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System (BIS) and Behavioral Approach System (BAS) scales – and their personal norm of 
reciprocity.30 These questionnaires were completed roughly 10 days after the experiment.  
 
Further details about our experimental protocol, participant instructions and further analyses 
are contained in the Supplementary Material. 
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Figure Legends 
 
Figure 1A 
 
Schematic representation of the task. Design of one period of the trust game. In each period, 
two anonymous individuals, a first mover (investor) and a second mover (trustee), receive an 
endowment of 10 points each. The investor must decide how many points he wants to 
transfer to the trustee. The experimenter quadruples the invested points and transfers them to 
the trustee, who then decides how many points he would like to back-transfer to the investor. 
In order to reduce the cognitive complexity of the game, the strategy space was limited for 
both the investor and the trustee. The investor could transfer 1, 4, 7, or 10 points (1 point 
equals 0.20 CHF which was about 0.18 US-$ at the time the experiment was conducted) and 
the trustee had three options: he could back-transfer nothing, a quarter of the received 
amount, or he could back-transfer an amount that equalized the period payoff between the 
investor and the trustee. The latter restriction also has the added advantage that the 
reputational implications of different trustee behaviors are transparent. For example, paying 
back nothing is unambiguously bad for the formation of a good reputation, while equalizing 
payoffs is unambiguously good.  
 
Figure 1B 
 
Trustee’s decision screen in the reputation condition. On the top section of the screen, the 
trustee can see his decisions in the three previous periods. The information about past 
decisions is not in chronological order. The trustee also knows that in this condition the 
investor is informed about the trustee’s previous three decisions before he makes a transfer 
decision. Thus, the trustee knows that the investor can condition her transfer on the trustee’s 
previous three back-transfer decisions. This also means that the trustee’s back-transfer in the 
current period affects the information the future investors receive about him, i.e. it affects his 
reputation in future periods. The trustee’s decision screen also contains information about the 
current investor’s transfer and the resulting points at the trustee’s disposal in the mid section 
of the screen. The bottom section features three clickable buttons for the trustee’s decision. 
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Figure 2 
 
The trustees’ behavioral responses. Comparison of mean of back-transfer in the reputation vs. 
the anonymous condition; data pooled over all stimulation groups. 
 
 
Figure 3 
 
The trustee's behavioral responses across stimulation conditions. (A) Mean back-transfer 
associated with the investor's highest investment in the reputation condition. Subjects whose 
right DLPFC is disrupted back-transfer significantly less points than those in the other two 
stimulation groups (P < 0.02). (B) Mean back-transfer associated with the investor's highest 
investment in the anonymous condition.  
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